Taking Taiwan: Chinese Naval-Blockade Options

Say you’ve been trying to subvert the government, demoralize the citizens, and gain control of a nearby island nation through years of propaganda, threats, and espionage…but it just hasn’t worked. You are out of patience, after sternly warning said republic (which is really a wayward province of yours): “We can do this the easy way, or we can do this the hard way.” 

Unfortunately, the hard way is very hard indeed. You seem to have just enough paraphernalia and manpower to pull an amphibious invasion off, but you can’t be sure…and you can’t afford to fail: too much bloodshed and destruction, and too many repercussions.

What to do?

Well, it is an island, after all. Perhaps a blockade can get you what you want.

The question of how China will handle its Taiwan dilemma is occupying the center of military minds everywhere nowadays, when they aren’t busy cogitating about the mucky conflict in Ukraine. So, this isn’t the first article addressing a blockade of Taiwan, and it won’t be the last. It will, however, present a detailed synthesis of the latest thinking on the subject. Hence our title, “Taking Taiwan: Chinese Naval-Blockade Options”.

This article serves as the follow-up to Greymantle’s previous article on the Chinese PLA Navy capabilities dated November 2024 and is the first of a three-part limited series.

STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF BLOCKADING TAIWAN

From Beijing’s viewpoint, an air/sea blockade has distinct advantages over a direct cross-strait, kinetic invasion.  After all, the point is not to obliterate Taiwan, but to fold it neatly into China proper – of course, without its current government.

Given China’s immense naval and air assets, any conventional opposition that Taiwan might offer to such a blockade would be easily brushed aside. Compared with a land assault, the casualties from a blockade would be minimal.

With a blockade, specific targeting could contain excessive damage.  More significantly, maritime trade is crucial to Taiwan’s economy: 97% of the Republic’s fuel and 70% of its food are imported, and exports are vital to its GDP.

Additionally, Beijing will want as little outside interference to its operation as possible. In general, an air/sea blockade would provoke less world outcry than the massive violence unleashed by a sudden amphibious attack.  The latter could result in all kinds of pressure – diplomatic and otherwise — not only from Western countries, but also from major Chinese neighbors like India and Japan.

There is another consideration. The transactional nature of the current U.S. administration suggests even less commitment to Taiwan’s defense than that of recent prior administrations (which was rather uncertain, at best).  If China can pull off a blockade of Taiwan without drawing a major U.S. economic and military response, it will be a stunning victory, while also shrinking U.S. prestige as protector of the Western Pacific.

For our purposes, Greymantle will examine the architecture of China’s blockade choices with an assumption that it will be unhindered by external forces, and we focus on China’s likely naval warfare tactics with the view that China will want to avoid starting a ‘shooting war’ for as long as feasible.

RECENT CHINESE “DRESS REHEARSALS” FOR A BLOCKADE

For anyone who has been paying attention, China has been practicing for this kind of naval/air operation intensively for the last three years.

Besides incessantly violating the 4epublic’s air space (up 81% from 2023), Beijing has implemented several major sea exercises in the vicinity of the island, expressing displeasure over hints of greater independence. The first “drill” was launched to protest Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to the capital, Taipei.

Greymantle is not the only one who believes these operations to be practice drills for a future blockade of Taiwan. Admiral Sam Paparo, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leader, said recently that the Chinese military’s “aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan right now are not exercises, as they call them. They are rehearsals.”

Admiral Paparo also emphasized the increased intensity, pointing to an air/sea/land drill that had taken place last summer. It was composed of 42 brigades normally composed of 5,000 men each, though only elements were probably deployed, as well as 150 Chinese navy vessels and 200 amphibious assault craft.

Beijing disfavors the new president of Taiwan, William Lai, because he and his party emphasize sovereignty. The largest of these rehearsals kicked off late last year.  An article in January’s Global Digest describes it well:

“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army quietly carried out a sweeping military operation in the Western Pacific and around Taiwan—its largest naval deployment since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This show of force simulated the interdiction of hostile ships seeking to break a Taiwan blockade. The PLA Navy warships and aircraft simulated attacking foreign ships while the coast guard practiced intercepting commercial vessels as well as blockading Taiwan’s maritime trade routes. This massive show of force highlights the PLA’s capability to project power eastward into the First Island Chain and was meant as a strong message to the incoming U.S. administration.”**

This exercise took place from December 9th to 12th, 2024. China deployed 90 warships, as well as numerous aircraft and Coast Guard vessels.

Seven closed air-space zones were established along the coasts of four Chinese provinces, spanning the First Island Chain to the southernmost Japanese waters. Additionally, the People’s Army-Navy (PLAN) designated six live-fire patrol areas around Taiwan.

The exercise included:

• Simulated blockades: The PLA Navy simulated blockades in areas around Taiwan and further east into the Pacific Ocean, particularly in the strategic Bashi Strait (south of the island) and Yamaguchi Strait (to the north). These two are the only wide openings to the East and South China Seas, and thus they are the most likely pathways for external interference.
• Airspace intrusions: The PLA Air Force launched numerous sorties, and regularly violated Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
• Missile threats: There were several missile test splashdowns in the vicinity of Taiwan, intended to show how easily they could have landed on the island proper.

OPTION #1: A “SOFT” BLOCKADE TESTS THE RESOLVE OF OTHER ACTORS AT LOW COST

The main advantage of a blockade is flexibility: it can be dialed up or down, unlike an amphibious assault. There are two recent reports issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that present China’s options in depth.

The report points out that a “soft” or limited blockade might accomplish several of Beijing’s goals. For instance, such an operation would present a vague “grey zone” hostile operation as merely a law enforcement effort, or a quarantine. Not only would this “punish” Taiwan for some perceived overstep, but it would also trumpet to the world that the republic is not as sovereign as it pretends to be.

Of course, Beijing would first announce some legal pretext to justify its actions.  In this operation, only China’s Coast Guard, Maritime Safety Administration, and Maritime Militia would form the main enforcement elements, thus bolstering the legal pretext. The PLA navy might not be directly involved in the blockade itself.

A quarantine would not necessarily qualify as an act of war; consequently, both American and other international responses could be hesitant and diffuse, particularly if other nations’ sea commerce is allowed to pass freely through the crucial Taiwan Strait.

Taipei itself would hesitate to start a shooting war in such a situation, and the government would be reluctant to challenge the operation with its inferior forces. CSIS’s report also deems it likely that “threats alone could compel most shipping companies to comply, meaning China may not have to interdict many shipping vessels to achieve the desired effect.”

APPLYING THE QUARANTINE: MECHANICS OF A “SOFT” BLOCKADE

China would likely begin a limited blockade of Taiwan by declaring “enhanced customs inspection rules.”  These would require all cargo and tanker vessels — within a certain radius headed for Taiwan — to file “advance customs declarations” with their authorities.  These sudden regulatory activities could tie up commercial traffic for days, or even weeks.

Beijing’s customs inspectors would board merchant vessels before they reach a Taiwanese port. They might insist on conducting inspections, interviewing ship’s personnel, and force other strictures against noncompliant ships.  An assortment of penalties could be levied, including onerous fines. Of course, the ships and their cargos would be denied access to their original destinations.

At least six patrol zones would be established around the island, one for each of Taiwan’s six major ports of entry. An air interdiction of some kind might also be imposed. All the likely patrol zones are situated 24 nautical miles from Taiwan’s territorial baseline, which Taiwan claims as a “contiguous zone.”

Not all six ports would have to be contained, however.  A powerful first step could be to simply focus operations on the main port, Kaohsiung, which is located at the southern tip of Taiwan. Altogether, the port handles 57% of Taiwan’s national maritime trade: specifically, 16% of the exports, and 70% of fuel, food, and everything else necessary to run the economy.

CHINA’S THREE MAJOR MARITIME FLEETS EXERT BEIJING’S AUTHORITY

The main maritime thrust of a limited blockade would be undertaken by China’s heavily militarized Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) — the world’s largest and most lethal. The potential use of the CCG by China is an important element in any understanding of the potential endgames of the China Taiwan conflict.

Recent reports state that the CCG operates over 1,275 vessels, including cutters, patrol boats, and rescue ships. The militarized cutters are unusually large, and they sport more dangerous weapons than mere water cannons. These ships range from 1,500 tons to the 12,000-ton displacement of the Zhaotou-class. (Outweighing some U.S. Navy (USN) destroyers.) 

Next in significance is China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), which employs 20,000 personnel and deploys numerous cutters, patrol boats, and rescue vessels. One of its largest, the Haixum 31 cutter, displaces 3,000 tons. This group would supplement the CCG’s presence, add to the façade of a “police action,” and intercept smaller ships and light craft.

The Chinese Maritime Militia’s vessel count is hard to pin down, but it is considerable. It has been described as “a network of organized, trained, and armed personnel operating in fishing vessels and other civilian craft.” The report adds that this force could “fill gaps in China’s ISR and complicate Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness by swarming in certain areas. The militia could also potentially aid in logistics by ferrying limited amounts of equipment and personnel to PLA vessels supporting the blockade.”

For this “soft” blockade, Beijing will likely deploy 10 of its most impressive CCG ships just outside Kaohsiung, along with some small MSA vessels. Perhaps 20 maritime militia and MSA craft will be stationed off Taiwan’s remaining five main ports on light patrol duty.

For its part, the Chinese Navy (PLAN) might assemble five Surface Action Groups (SAGs), or 30 + warships, to picket the approaches that an external fleet might use.

Chinese air force and naval warplanes will form an air blanket over the island.  PLAN’s four aircraft carriers would also likely participate, but probably not all at once.

CHINA’S NEW WEAPON: HEAVY NAVAL DRONES

An interesting video reveals that the Chinese military has developed a fleet of heavy drones. It has done this by utilizing the air frames and bolstered engines of rather elderly J-6 jet fighters (a design inherited from Russia 60 years ago). These unmanned aircraft rest in large air-base hangers close to the coast of Fujian province, just across from the island.

Such drones – launched from land or sea– can still move jet-fast and perform various scouting and warning tasks, without risking a modern aircraft and its pilot. Of course, China has at least five other types of naval drones that it can deploy. The J-8 weapons can joint flights of manned air sorties and lure enemy fire from manned aircraft.

All drones will likely be tested somewhat during a semi-blockade, but their presence will undoubtedly become more evident if there is an escalation of some kind of shooting war.

FOR A SUCCESSFUL BLOCKADE, TIMING IS EVERYTHING

The key issue with a blockade of any kind is timing.  For one thing, he logistical burden and coordination details are heavy; for a second, limited blockade (i.e. one week or two) would impose relatively modest economic damage on the island republic.  A longer- duration, but still limited, quarantine may still be unable to crack Taiwan’s integral political and social cohesion.

China’s goals for any potential limited, or ‘soft’ blockade therefore appear to be restricted to testing the international community’s reaction to China’s action against international shipping to Taiwan and to highlight its ability to dominate the wayward province whenever it wishes.

The degree to which the international shipping industry will try to adjust to the quarantine is also important for Beijing to know.  China wants answers to these questions before it proceeds to the next phase of its overall plan for subduing Taiwan. 

Beijing will then weigh the risks and rewards.  Analysts believe that this type of “quarantine” operation could be called off within a month, if a high percentage of China’s goals appear to have been realized.

A heavy Coast Guard and air patrol presence may remain, however. These would frequently violate Taiwan’s contiguous zone, simply to show which nation is really in control.

OPTION 2: THE “HARD” BLOCKADE

Following an initially limited blockade of Taiwan, Beijing could decide that its goals have not been sufficiently achieved.  In that case, China might well choose to squeeze Taiwan much harder with a full blockade.

This choice could be decided for one, or both, of two reasons: 1) the conviction that the Taiwanese Republic’s population would become demoralized by a hard blockade (coupled with endless cyberattacks and misinformation). Then, pro-China factions could overthrow the hapless government and negotiate a Beijing-favored ceasefire. Second, the full blockade would soften the republic’s defenses and ready it for the horror of a full-scale amphibious invasion.

LOGISTICS OF A “HARD” BLOCKADE

The Chinese have thought long and hard about the specifics of a full-frontal blockade:

Science of Campaigns, a textbook published in 2006 by China’s National Defense University, defines a “joint blockade campaign” (联合封锁战役) as “an offensive campaign that is implemented by Navy-, Air Force-, Second Artillery-[ a missile unit],and Army campaign large formations with the assistive concerted efforts of the armed police force and militia . . . to sever enemy economic and military connections with the outside world.”

What naval and air assets would be necessary to apply this blockade? For its early stages –before any USN involvement, the 2022 sea exercise gives a rough idea of how Beijing would use its forces. In this situation, the regular navy would shift places with the Coast Guard, although some of the latter’s vessels and those of the MSN and Maritime Militia would still participate and support PLAN and air force activities, including supply runs and rescue work.

During its 2022 exercise, China mobilized over 50 naval vessels and more than 100 aircraft

Naval vessels included:

• 1 Aircraft Carrier: Liaoning (now, the newest carrier, the Fujian)
• Destroyers: Type 052D and Type 051C
• Submarines: Type 093 and Type 094 (plus minisubs for minelaying)
• Frigates: Type 054A and Type 053H3
• Amphibious Assault Ships: Type 071 (unlikely to be used in initial blockade)

The aircraft involved were primarily:

• Fighter Jets: J-11, J-16, and J-20
• Bombers: H-6 (These also carry antiship missiles.)
• Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft: Y-8 and KJ-500

This deployment of forces could be easily supplemented after a shooting war started, but these numbers appear to be enough to populate the designated patrol boxes and no-fly airspace zones established around the republic. The most recent exercise (late 2024– Joint Sword-2024C) employed 90 PLAN warships and many Coast Guard vessels, but these were deployed over a wider area than Taiwan alone. It is difficult to estimate the number of aircraft and drones that China could employ, but they possess thousands overall.

The sharp initial attacks would focus on disrupting command and control by chopping the island’s internal communication networks into pieces. Beijing will then flood the internet and airwaves with dis- and misinformation galore, twenty-four seven.

Just outside each of the six major Taiwanese harbors, small submarines will be laying active (or possibly timed) mines. These craft are especially useful in the confined and rather shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait.  Minisubs are far less detectable than the usual heavy ones, and their captains know this sea bottom well. 

Simultaneously, missiles, jet fighters, drones, and the navy’s guns would begin pounding Taiwanese military targets, particularly those threatening the blockade, such as coastal defenses. China would also destroy selected administrative centers and, of course, fuel and food storage structures.

At this early stage, no American bases would be assaulted because the United States would have not (in all likelihood) joined the fight.

Unlike in a quarantine or “soft” blockade, the six live-fire zones established around the island would now become serious.  Taiwan would presumably fight back, but its navy and air force would be quickly worn down by superior PLAN numbers.

The republic’s best hope of defense would be a major missile response of its own, particularly at the early stage of the attack when China’s amphibious assault ships are still 50 miles away off Taiwan’s coast. Ideally, the missiles fired would be fired from launchers buried deep within the western facings of the steep mountainous spine running up the island. This would be the “Hedgehog Defense” that US advisors have been urging Taiwan to emphasize.

HOW LONG COULD TAIWAN HOLD OUT AGAINST A HARD BLOCKADE?

Let us again consider the timing issue.

If Beijing is relying on citizens’ demoralization and overthrow of Taiwan’s government from within, or from the streets to win the island, its leaders must recognize that such an unravelling process takes time. Moreover, the longer it goes on, the more likely is it that a hard blockade would severely aggravate international response to China’s aggression. As with the limited blockade option, the aggressor does not have the luxury of time.

In other words, the longer a ‘hard’ blockade continues without Taiwan knuckling under, the more encouraged the U.S. and its allies will be to mount a forceful response diplomatically, commercially, and perhaps, militarily.  Beijing is attempting a delicate high-wire act here: that is, it must quickly assimilate Taiwan while sidestepping World War III.

To get more specific, let’s consider Taiwan’s stockpiles of food, fuel and ammunition:

“Reportedly, Taiwan has less than two months of coal and natural gas reserves for electricity generation; however it has six months of crude oil reserves and six months of food stockpiles. Under the most likely hard blockade scenarios, these stockpiles would be subject to Chinese bombardment, reducing Taiwan’s ability to resist. Making matters more challenging, a survey conducted by the CSIS China Power Project found that many experts believe China could sustain major military operations against Taiwan for at least six months.” ****

Greymantle believes, however, that China will not be able to sustain a hard blockade for six, or even three, months, without risking the direst repercussions from other major powers.

Under a hard blockade, commerce through the Taiwan Strait would be cut off because of incessant military traffic and live fire issues. International trade will  be severely crippled, enraging numerous nations. The chaos and economic pain (even to China itself) would become intolerable. Greymantle believes that more than 4-6 weeks of a hard blockade might well force a military response from the Americans – even under the current administration.

Moreover, Taiwan makes one product that no other nation can long go without.

THE MICRO-CHIPS MUST FLOW

Advanced chips produced in Taiwan by the uniquely vital Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) make up “55% of global market share for contract chip fabrication.” TSMC’s products also comprise about 20% of the Taiwanese Republic’s total exports and are thus a critical part of its GDP.  Beijing would never destroy the TSMC fabrication plants because it wants them for itself.

These chips won’t be going anywhere, so the blockade would soon have very serious economic effects on most industrialized nations.  China’s Western adversaries like the United States and the UK would object loudly, but so would other members of the BRICS group that China wants to impress, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and Saudi Arabia. China needs the tacit acquiescence of this group of nations to its capture of Taiwan in order to pull it off. 

OTHER OPTIONS

Under a highly time-sensitive hard blockade situation, the seizure of small islands administered by Taipei might prove consequential: these are Kinmen or Matsu abutting China; the Penghus near Taiwan; or the Pratas in the South China Sea.  Their rapid absorption into the motherland would be presented as a minor triumph for Xi and the Communist Party.

Some analysts believe that China may halt its first week of a hard blockade with a proposed ceasefire, sweetening it by offering to ferry those terrorized civilians who don’t want to be mauled any further to ‘safety’ on the Chinese mainland.

China will probably propose this, or a similar act of faux mercy. After all, any such blockade will be designed to demonstrate dominance, as well as undercut Taipei’s authority, cower shipping companies, and bolster the idea of the motherland’s power and magnanimity.

Pro-Beijing elements of the abused Taiwanese population would likely push for acceptance of a ceasefire on China’s terms. After the severe punishment undergone during the prior week, some, possibly many, Taiwanese might beg their leaders to accept Beijing’s offer, no matter how harsh it is likely to be in practice. If Taipei refuses to negotiate, its internal political divisions would, of course, be exacerbated.

CONCLUSION: CHINA’S HIGH-STAKES BALANCING ACT

There is no way to realistically assess the core resilience of the Taiwanese nation until there is an attempt to break it. That is why China will proceed cautiously—as it always does – slowly accumulating advantages and looking for the perfect time its leaders consider ideal…but, when it does, China’s strike will be sudden and savage. Any Taiwan invasion strategy must involved rapid deployment of military assets to succeed.

It is something of a cliché at this point, but China’s master strategist once wrote this: “The skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.” 

Don’t think that Xi Jinping hasn’t read Sun Tzu many times. This is the path he prefers, and a serious blockade could deliver it.

But…if it doesn’t…

If a hard blockade has not subdued Taiwan’s determination to remain a sovereign entity, with too much time passing, then Xi Jinping will escalate to the next level of violence, which the ancient sage would probably have warned him about – an amphibious invasion of a hostile island nation.

Richard Jupa

(The next two articles in this Greymantle limited series will examine what an amphibious invasion of Taiwan by PLA forces would look like, and then provide an estimate and evaluation of what form U.S. and allied interference could take.)